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SAME OLD, SAME OLD: SCIENTIFIC 
EVIDENCE PAST AND PRESENT 
Edward K. Cheng* 
LAWS OF MEN AND LAWS OF NATURE: TH E  HISTORY OF SCIENTIFIC EXPERT 
TESTIMONY IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA. By Tai Golan. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press. 2004. Pp. vii, 325. $49.95 . 
For over twenty years, and particularly since the Supreme Court's 
Daubert' decision in 1993, much ink has been spilled debating the problem 
of scientific evidence in the courts. Are jurors or, in the alternative, judges 
qualified to assess scientific reliability? Do courts really need to be con­
cerned about "junk science"? What mechanisms can promote better 
decisionmaking in scientific cases? Even a cursory scan of the literature 
shows the recent explosion of interest in these issues, precipitating new 
treatises, hundreds of articles, and countless conferences for judges, practi­
tioners, and academics. 
To this literature, Professor Tal Golan2 adds Laws of Men and Laws of 
Nature, a welcome and much-needed book-length work on the history of 
scientific evidence. The book, which derives from Golan's doctoral disserta­
tion, can be roughly divided into two principal parts: The lion's share 
concentrates on nineteenth-century developments in England and the United 
States, often in the context of business-related civil litigation. The remainder 
looks at fin de siecle America, more narrowly focusing on the relationship 
between the legal system and three then-emerging technologies: blood mi­
croscopy, x-rays, and lie detectors. An epilogue attempts to tie these 
historical discussions to the modern day Frye-Daubert debates, but it is 
largely an afterthought and is appropriately separated as such. 
Perhaps most salient among the book's goals is Golan's aspiration to 
bridge the divide between legal history and history of science by revealing a 
deeply symbiotic relationship between scientists and courts in the nineteenth 
century (pp. 1-2). As to Golan's success on this score, being a scientific 
evidence person as opposed to a historian, I defer to more qualified 
* Assistant Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. J.D. 2001, Harvard; M.Sc. (Informa­
tion Systems) 1998, London School of Economics; B.S.E. 1997, Princeton. -Ed. I would like to 
thank Jennifer Mnookin, Paul Schwartz, Margaret Berger, Jenny Diamond Cheng, and Tai Golan for 
helpful thoughts and conversations. Cathy Altier provided superb research assistance. Generous 
support was provided by the Project on Scientific Knowledge and Public Policy and the Brooklyn 
Law School Dean's Summer Research Fund. 
I. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993) (establishing a multi­
factor test for assessing scientific reliability and tasking the judge with a "gatekeeping" role). 
2. Professor of History, University of California, San Diego. 
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colleagues.3 Instead, I would like to focus on Golan's  other stated goal of 
providing historical context to the modem scientific evidence debates (p. 3). 
In this respect, the book performs a valuable service for modem reformers. 
After all , we have a natural tendency to think of scientific evidence 
problems as new: Daubert certainly is new; toxic torts are new; and 
"science" writ large perpetually seems new. But, as the accounts from Laws 
of Men and Laws of Nature emphatically remind us, the problem of 
scientific evidence is profoundly old (p. 4). 
My chief regret is that Golan's treatment on this score fails to trace the 
problems and solutions of scientific evidence in any significant detail be­
yond the early 1900s. This is surely an unfair criticism, especially given his 
primary historiographic goal, but the modem field of scientific evidence 
could have really benefited from an unbroken account to the present. In­
deed, if we supplement and update Golan's discussion-as I hope to do in a 
limited way in this Review-we quickly see that the problems and proposed 
solutions are not just old but also frustratingly recurring. 
A. Folkes v. Chadd 
Laws of Men and Laws of Nature opens with Folkes v. Chadd ( 1783),4 
scientific evidence's origin tale of sorts. According to legend, in an epic act 
of judicial creation, Lord Mansfield approved and set in motion the modem 
system of adversarial experts (pp. 6, 4 1-44). As Golan skillfully demon­
strates through a detailed reconstruction of the case, however, l ike most 
origin tales, the Folkes fable turns out to be overly simplistic and triumphal­
ist (p. 44). Lord Mansfield, it appears, couldn't have cared less about 
"inaugurating a new practice of calling experts as partisan witnesses" (pp. 
6-7). That dubious distinction apparently belongs to no one person but in­
stead to the gradual accretion of adversarialism and party control in the face 
of an oddly complacent and perhaps overconfident e ighteenth-century Eng­
lish judiciary (pp. 50-5 1 ). 
Blame issues aside, Golan's account of Folkes provides a look into late­
eighteenth-century litigation that is fascinating not for its curiosities but 
rather for its parallels to modem cases. Indeed, it seems that the broader 
theoretical questions that shadow scientific evidence cases and commenta­
tors today were present from the very beginning. 
The setting for the Folkes drama was Wells Harbor, a natural harbor sur­
rounded by low-lying salt marshes in northeastern England. Human 
ingenuity (or hubris) being what it is, locals began draining the fertile 
marshland for agricultural use, counteracting the natural tidal flooding by 
constructing embankments. At the same time, the venerable harbor began 
3. E.g. Jennifer L. Mnook.in, Science at the Bar, AM. Sci., Nov.-Dec. 2004 , at x (reviewing 
laws of Men and laws of Nature). 
4. P. 6 n.2 (citing 3 SYLVESTER DOUGLAS, REPORTS OF CASES ARGUED AND DETERMINED 
IN THE COURT OF THE KING'S BENCH IN THE 'fwENTY-SECOND, 'fwENTY-THIRD, TwENTY-FOURTH 
AND TwENTY-FIFTH YEARS OF THE REIGN OF GEORGE III 160 (1831)). 
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silting up, threatening the shipping industry (p. 9). The harbor commission­
ers, of course, blamed the developers and their embankments. The 
landowners responded that the silting would have happened anyway (p. 22). 
A scientific battle royale was thus set .  
Just as they do today, the parties brought in  their expert-champions. The 
harbor commissioners primarily relied on evidence that was anecdotal and 
experience based. Their parade of witnesses recounted the "rapid deteriora­
tion" of the harbor after the embankment's construction (p. 37). The 
commissioners also retained a group of distinguished civil engineers, "prac­
tical men of science, skilled practitioners," whose expertise came from their 
extensive experience and practice (pp. 26, 32). In contrast, the landowners 
turned to "scientists" as the term is understood today. Their star witness, 
John Smeaton, was a preeminent, well-published scientist, a member of the 
Royal Society, and a natural philosopher who believed that phenomena 
could be best explained by applying scientific principles (pp. 25, 30-31). 
The Folkes court thereby immediately confronted two fundamental is­
sues that are still widely debated in scientific evidence circles. As an initial 
matter, should a court decide among competing scientific methodologies? 
The judges in Folkes exhibited the classic split . Chief Justice Gould in the 
lower court had no trouble excluding a witness who failed to measure up to 
standard (p. 39). Lord Mansfield, however, reversed. Unwilling to choose 
favorites, Mansfield left the decision up to the jury (p. 45). As Golan hints in 
his analysis, this Gould versus Mansfield debate is akin to the Hatfields and 
the McCoys. The "Goulds," like the Supreme Court in Daubert, find com­
fort in judicial gatekeeping against unreliable or "junk" expertise. The 
"Mansfields" maintain a more ecumenical view (p. 49). 
Presuming a gatekeeping role, courts then face the intractable question 
of what exactly constitutes good science. Modern scholars will recognize 
the two archetypal experts in Folkes: those who reason from anecdote and 
experience and those who reason from scientific principles. In a strange re­
versal of fortune, however, in Folkes, it was the scientist who was on the 
chopping block. A seemingly crabbed adherent to traditional experience­
based expertise, Gould excluded the scientist's theories for being speculative 
and not based on direct observation (pp. 39, 44). On appeal, Mansfield in 
retrospect played the role of luminary, the progressive who gave the emerg­
ing science based in natural philosophy a chance. Two hundred years later, 
Daubert has come full circle, but with a twist. Today, with science safely 
seated on its throne, Daubert offers the opportunity of eliminating experi­
ence-driven expertise from the courtroom, as a number of commentators 
have advocated for handwriting and fingerprint analysis and the like.5 One 
wonders if Mansfield would have been delighted or appalled. 
5. See, e.g., Robert Epstein, Fingerprints Meet Daubert: The Myth of Fingerprint "Science" 
ls Revealed, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 605, 624-25 (2002) (questioning the use of fingerprinting in light of 
the method's untested assumptions); D. Michael Risinger & Michael J. Saks, Science and Non­
science in the Courts: Daubert Meets Handwriting Identification Expertise, 82 lowA L. REV. 21, 35, 
39, 64-65 (1996) (questioning handwriting analysis). 
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B. Biased Experts and Conflicting Testimony 
To the modern observer, the elephant in the Folkes room is the problem 
of hired guns. Adversarial experts, after all, are routinely accused of distort­
ing science in their parties' favor. As Golan notes, however, Lord Mansfield 
makes no mention of the problem in his opinion. Judicial myopia is 
unlikely-the common law of evidence obsessed over and routinely dis­
qualified interested witnesses (p. 50). Golan offers an alternative, cultural 
explanation. Eighteenth-century English scientists were bound by gentle­
manly codes of honor that closely tied social status to credibility and 
reputation (p. 50). Bias was therefore no concern at all, because the royal 
judges could trust men of science to provide unbiased, truthful opinions in 
court (p. 5 1). 
This assumption, of course, was sheer folly. In nearly no time at all, courts 
faced "a continuous parade of leading men of science zealously contradicting 
each other from the witness stand" (p. 54). In a chapter appropriately entitled 
"The Common Liar, the Damned Liar, and the Scientific Expert,"6 Golan 
shows this phenomenon plaguing early nineteenth-century English courts. 
Was a new sugar-refining process dangerously prone to explosions? One 
group of prestigious experts swore it was; predictably, another swore it was 
not (p. 56). Did a copper-smelting operation create acid rain and destroy 
crops? Proponents testified it did; some opponents remarkably characterized 
the acid as "a blessing, a shield against cholera and other diseases" (p. 74). 
Pollution emanating from alum works, contaminated well water, even the 
scope of the prized magenta dye patent and the definition of "coal"-all of the 
cases suffered the "familiar spectacle of two parties presenting flatly contra­
dictory scientific evidence" (pp. 78, 80-8 1, 85, 9 1). 
Of course, scientists can reasonably disagree on occasion, even estab­
lishing two respectable schools of thought. But judges are no fools, and, as 
Golan describes, they quickly grew suspicious (p. 89). Either the scientists 
were dishonest, or they were helpless against clever manipulation by the 
attorneys.7 In any event, the experts were certainly not helping to resolve 
any cases. Juries were "bewildered, perplexed, and left in despair as to 
knowing how to decide" (p. 87). Judges became increasingly frustrated and 
"disgust[ ed] at the partisanship" of the witnesses (p. 62). 
Golan grimly notes that the conflicting testimony problem was not lim­
ited to civil litigation but spread to the criminal context as well (pp. 96-97). 
Two poison trials illustrate his point, although their "Crimes of the Century" 
status leaves one to wonder if they are representative-remember, in O .J. 
Simpson's trial, even DNA was made to look unclear. The exemplars never­
theless serve their purpose: in one case, the defense expert even bragged to 
friends that he thought the victim had been poisoned but that " [the prosecu-
6. See also p. 255 (quoting Judge William Foster at the New Hampshire Medical Society 
annual meeting in 1897: "There are three kinds of liars: the common liar, the damned liar, and the 
scientific expert."). 
7. 
Pp. 54, 105. Even the mighty Michael Faraday, father of electromagnetism, apparently 
was ensnared by plaintiff's counsel. P. 67. 
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tion expert] did not know how to find it" (p. 99). The Attorney General and 
the Lord Chief Justice (and in tum, the public) were predictably not amused 
(p. 100). By the 1860s, hardly anyone had any confidence in scientific evi­
dence. "[S]killed testimony, which ought to be the most decisive and 
convincing of them all, [was] of all the most suspicious and unsatisfactory."8 
Many lawyers today know about the problem of conflicting experts and 
the "battle of the experts" problem through a famous 190 1  article by 
Learned Hand: how can we expect jurors to decide between experts when 
the jurors' ignorance is the premise for allowing the expert to testify in the 
first place?9 As Golan shows, however, before 190 1  the dilemma was al­
ready old news (pp. 88, 1 39-40). And as modern commentators know, it has 
been a consistent refrain (or, perhaps less charitably, a broken record) ever 
since. IO Lay decisionmakers, of course, ultimately must rely on proxies like 
appearance, demeanor, and language to determine an expert's reliability, 11 
occasionally leading to spectacular blunders. Back in 1 859, jurors were 
fooled into believing the validity of a test for poison (p. 102). Fast forward­
ing to the present, in the oft-quoted 1 985 bench trial of Wells ex rel. 
Maihafer v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 1 2 the judge was fooled into believ­
ing that spermicides caused birth defects. As Sam Gross dryly notes, despite 
being "a first rate specimen of judicial craft" the Wells decision was "abso­
lutely wrong."13 No scientific evidence (including a comprehensive review 
by the FDA) ever linked spermicides to birth defects.14 The medical com­
munity had a conniption;15 the press had a field day.16 
8. P. 105 (quoting a January 1862 Saturday Review). 
9. Learned Hand, Historical and Practical Considerations Regarding Expen Testimony, 15 
HARV. L. REv. 40, 54 (190 I) ("[H]ow can the jury judge between two statements each founded upon 
an experience confessedly foreign in kind to their own? It is just because they are incompetent for 
such a task that the expert is necessary at all."). 
10. See, e.g., Lee M. Friedman, Expen Testimony, Its Abuse and Reformation, 19 YALE L.J. 
247, 249 (1909) (describing the problem of conflicting testimony, often given by unscrupulous 
experts, and its ability to confuse jurors); William A. Wick & Erle A. Kightlinger, Impanial Medical 
Testimony Under the Federal Civil Rules: A Tale of Three Doctors, 34 INS. CouNs. J. 115, 117 
(1967) (noting that jurors confronted with conflicting medical testimony may often choose "the best 
witness, rather than the best doctor"). 
11. Debra L. Worthington et al., Hindsight Bias, Daubert, and the Silicone Breast Implant 
Litigation, 8 PsYCHOL. Pue. PoL'Y & L. 154, 158 (2002) (describing a 1983 study concluding that 
jurors use an expert's appearance and "paralanguage" as proxies for reliability). 
12. 615 F. Supp. 262 (N.D. Ga. 1985). 
13. Samuel R. Gross, Expen Evidence, 1991 Wis. L. REv. 1113, 1122. But see Joseph L. 
Gastwirth, The Need for Careful Evaluation of Epidemiological Evidence in Product Liability 
Cases: A Reexamination of Wells v. Ortho and Key Pharmaceuticals, 2 LAW, PROBABILITY & RISK 
151, 18(µ!5 (2003) (arguing that given the specific facts of the case and the studies offered at the 
time by the parties, the Wells decision may be undeservedly vilified in the literature). 
14. Michael B. Bracken, Spermicidal Contraceptives and Poor Reproductive Outcomes: The 
Epidemiologic Evidence Against an Association, 151 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 552 
(1985). 
15. See, e.g., James L. Mills & Duane Alexander, Teratogens and "Litogens", 315 NEW 
ENG. J. MED. 1234 (1984). 
16. See, e. g., Editorial, Federa/Judges v. Science, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 1986, at A22. 
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The bias or dishonesty concern is also alive and well today. Federal Ju­
dicial Center surveys in both 199 1 and 1998 showed that federal district 
court judges thought the most common problem with expert testimony was 
experts "who 'abandon objectivity and become advocates for the side that 
hired them.' "17 The "scientist as prostitute" was the moving force behind 
Peter Huber's crusade against "junk science" in the 1980s.18 And recent 
revelations that forensic scientists fabricated results are related (although 
more extreme) examples of this phenomenon in the criminal context.19 
T hat the problems surrounding adversarial experts have stayed with us 
for over two hundred years should be entirely unremarkable. The methods 
of presenting expert knowledge are fundamentally the same today as they 
were in 1783, and the system's structure breeds these pathologies. If any­
thing, the system's attributes have gotten worse. Experts are now paid 
handsomely for their services, and their future marketability is influenced 
by their parties' success. Experts also spend considerable time preparing and 
rehearsing with their attorney-employers and worrying about the opposing 
side's cross-examination.20 It is no small wonder then that even a scrupulous 
expert will shade his testimony in his party's favor. At the same time, ju­
rors--carefully culled to ensure an utter lack of scientific expertise-must 
absorb complex scientific principles presented orally,21 and they must then 
choose between conflicting experts. T he results are predictably far from 
desirable. 
C .  Solutions Then, Solutions Now 
Persistent problems are understandable-after all, some problems are 
just hard to solve. W hat is more worrisome, however, is that even the solu­
tions appear to be recurring. In a terrific chapter chronicling the nineteenth­
century debates on scientific evidence in England and the United States, 
Golan depicts distraught scientists and lawyers searching for a cure (pp. 
120, 140). By 1 860, there was a general feeling in England that the "crisis 
[in expert evidence] had reached intolerable proportions," and that the prob­
lem stemmed from improper legal procedures or institutions (pp. 120-21). 
At the same time, " [t]he reform of expert testimony became one of the hot­
test topics in the meetings of the various bar associations that mushroomed 
17. MOLLY TREADWAY JOHNSON ET AL., FED. JUD. CTR., EXPERT TESTIMONY IN FEDERAL 
CIVIL TRIALS: A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS 5 (2000). 
18. P ETER W. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM 17-20 
(1991). 
19. Craig M. Cooley, Reforming the Forensic Science Community to Avert the Ultimate 
Injustice, 15 STAN. L. & PoL'Y REv. 381, 399-406 (2004). 
20. Gross, supra note 13, at 1138-39. 
21. See David L. Faigman et al., Check Your Crystal Ball at the Courthouse Door; Please: 
Exploring the Past, Understanding the Present, and Worrying about the Future of Scientific Evi­
dence, 15 CARDOZO L. REv. 1799, 1821 (1994) ("Indeed, judicial assessment of validity might be 
better conducted through written briefs rather than oral testimony."). 
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in late-nineteenth-century America" (p. 140). Proposals for reform 
abounded. 
Golan recounts an amazing series of lectures in 1860 at the Royal Soci­
ety of Arts in England in which members laid out, for all intents and 
purposes, what many will recognize as the modem corpus of scientific evi­
dence reforms. Chemist Robert Angus Smith proposed the use of 
independent experts and a move toward written rather than oral expert tes­
timony (pp. 111-13). He and Professor Alfred Swaine Taylor, whom Golan 
describes as "the most sought after scientific witness in Britain," also advo­
cated for scientific advisors who could help judges better understand the 
scientific material and keep witnesses honest (pp. 112, 115-16). Edwin 
Chadwick advocated for "scientific tribunals," to which courts could offi­
cially refer cases for comment (p. 113). Opponents (mainly lawyers)22 
argued that experts often had legitimate differences of opinion or that the 
system was already as good as possible. To them, the reforms were therefore 
unnecessary (pp. 114-16). A generation later, the same debate reemerged in 
two sparring English scientific journals, one mundanely entitled Chemical 
News, the other more curiously named The Journal of Gas Lighting, Water 
Supply, & Sanitary Improvement (pp. 129-35). Identical proposals surfaced 
across the Atlantic, provoking similar naysayers.23 
These proposals for court-appointed experts, scientific tribunals, and the 
like, however, were not unique to the nineteenth-century. Indeed, combining 
portions of Golan's book with the subsequent scientific evidence literature 
reveals that these ideas have been regularly recycled and unsuccessfully at­
tempted over the last 150 years.24 
1. Court-Appointed Experts 
Court-appointed expert witnesses are one of the oldest and most popular 
proposed solutions to the problem of the biased or dishonest expert.25 The 
22. P. 120 (noting that almost every scientific commentator from Victorian England seemed 
to support neutral experts and scientific advisors). 
23. Pp. 135-36, 140. For example, in a posthumous 1897 Harvard Law Review article, Judge 
William Foster argued that conflicting experts were beneficial because they generated additional 
investigation. William L. Foster, Expen Testimony,-Prevalent Complaints and Proposed Remedies, 
11 HARV. L. REV. 169, 179 (1897), cited in p.140 n.65. Judge Foster further argued that the prob­
lems with expert testimony were exaggerated and would not be cured by any of the proposals. Thus, 
"it [was] best to 'let well enough alone.' " Id. at 185. 
24. See, e.g., WILLARD BARTLETT, N.Y. STATE MED. Ass'N, MEDICAL EXPERT EVIDENCE: 
THE OBSTACLES TO RADICAL CHANGE IN THE PRESENT SYSTEM 10-11 (1899) (arguing that to com­
bat junk science, courts should appoint independent experts, technical advisors, and members of 
consulting panels); Peter J. Goss et al., Clearing Away the Junk: Coun-Appointed Expens, Scientifi­
cally Marginal Evidence, and the Silicone Gel Breast Implant litigation, 56 Fooo & DRUG L.J. 227, 
227 (2001) (discussing the three commonly proposed reforms); Harold L. Korn, Law, Fact, and 
Science in the Courts, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 1080, 1083-84 (1966) (same). 
25. Gross, supra note 13, at 1189 (noting that court-appointed experts have been suggested 
for over a century); Stephan Landsman, Of Witches, Madmen, and Products Liability: An Historical 
Survey of the Use of Expen Testimony, 13 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 131, 156 (1995) (remarking that court­
appointed expert proposals are "as old as the American republic"). 
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proposal has natural appeal . To the extent that the problems of expert testi­
mony are caused by partisanship and financial interest, insulating experts 
from party influence makes sense. 
Perhaps as a result, court-appointed expert proposals have enjoyed a 
good deal of traction. Nearly every scientist-commentator in V ictorian Eng­
land supported them,26 and legal commentators have regularly discussed and 
advocated for their use ever since. 27 At the beginning of the twentieth cen­
tury, Michigan and Rhode Island passed limited bills allowing the use of 
neutral experts, 28 and California introduced similar legislation.29 By mid­
century, both the Model Code of Evidence and the Model Expert Testimony 
Act included provisions for court-appointed witnesses.30 Ultimately, court­
appointed experts found their way into Federal Rule of Evidence 706, and 
today, over thirty states have adopted Rule 706.31 Even Justice Breyer, in his 
concurrence to General Electric Co. v. Joiner,32 famously advocated for the 
f . d 33 use o court-appomte experts. 
Unfortunately, court-appointed experts have been far from a triumph in 
practice . As David Kaye notes, " [n]ow, as then," court-appointed experts are 
often proposed as a solution but are almost never used.34 A Federal Judicial 
Center survey published in 1994 showed that, despite having clear authority 
26. P. 120; see also Landsman, supra note 25, at 146 (reporting that between 1820 and the 
1850s, doctors increasingly supported "nonadversarial methods of gathering expert medical opin­
ion"). 
27. E.g. , 1 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVI­
DENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON L AW§ 563, at 966 (2d ed. 1923), discussed in Gross, supra note 13, 
at 1189; F. Hastings Griffin, Jr., Impartial Medical Testimony: A Trial Lawyer in Favor, 34 TEMP. 
L.Q. 402, 405-15 (1961); Clemens Herschel, Services of Experts in the Conduct of Judicial Inquir­
ies, 21 AM. L. REV. 571, 577 (1887); Emory Washburn, Testimony of Experts, 1 AM. L. REV. 45, 61 
(1867); Wick & Kightlinger, supra note 10, at 117; Note, Expert Testimony, 5 AM. L. REv. 428, 
441-42 (1870); Karen Butler Reisinger, Note, Court-Appointed Expert Panels: A Comparison of 
Two Models, 32 IND. L. REv. 225, 234 (1998); see also Landsman, supra note 25, at 144 (describing 
a very early proposal by T.R. Beck, writer of the treatise Elements of Medical Jurisprudence, in 
1823). For comprehensive lists of previous proposals for court-appointed experts, see DAVID H. 
KAYE ET AL., THE NEW WIGMORE: A TREATISE ON EVIDENCE, Expert Evidence§ 10.4.1, at 347-48 
nn.3-5 (2004), and Gross, supra note 13, at 1116 n.8. 
28. Friedman, supra note 10, at 249-50 (describing the Michigan and Rhode Island statutes). 
Michigan's statute was ultimately declared unconstitutional because it infringed on the executive's 
power to call witnesses in criminal cases. P. 257; People v. Dickerson, 129 N.W. 198 (Mich. 1910); 
Note, Appointment of Expert Wimesses by the Court, 24 HARV. L. REv. 483, 483-84 (1911). 
29. A.M. Kidd, The Proposed Expert Evidence Bill, 3 CAL. L. REv. 216, 218 (1914) (de­
scribing proposed court-appointed expert legislation in California); see also KAYE ET AL., supra 
note 27, § 10.4.1, at 348 n.4 (citing a proposal by the New York Bar Association in 1909). 
30. Mason Ladd, Expert Testimony, 5 VAND. L. REV. 414, 430-31 (1952) (noting that both 
provisions permitted court-appointed experts to co-exist with traditional adversarial experts). The 
Model Expert Testimony Act provision was subsequently endorsed by the ABA Committee on the 
Improvement of the Law of Evidence. Gross, supra note 13, at 1189. 
31. JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, 3 WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE 
§ 706(04) (1988), cited in Gross, supra note 13, at 1189-90. 
32. 522 U.S. 136 (1997). 
33. Id. at 147, 149-50 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
34. KAYE ET AL., supra note 27, § 10.4.1, at 348; see also Gross, supra note 13, at 1191; 
Worthington et al., supra note 11, at 162 (noting that judges rarely appoint experts). 
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to do so, 80 percent of federal district court judges have never appointed an 
35 expert. 
Moreover, mechanisms to facilitate neutral experts have historically 
been non-starters, often due to judicial apathy or outside resistance. To help 
judges locate and select experts, scientific, medical, and legal associations 
have attempted from time to time to set up pre-approved lists of experts.36 
Golan, for example, discusses proposals from bar associations to establish 
official lists in the mid-nineteenth century.37 These attempts fell flat. At­
tempts were also made in Massachusetts and elsewhere to establish such 
panels in the 1 880s38 and again around 191039 -all were rejected by state 
legislatures. 
In the 1950s, renewed efforts succeeded in establishing official medical 
expert lists in New York City,40 New Jersey,41 Baltimore,42 Miami, Cleveland, 
Los Angeles, and the federal district courts for the Western and Eastern Dis­
tricts of Pennsylvania and the Northern District of Illinois.43 Some early 
reviews seemed genuinely positive: judges found an increase in testimony 
quality and a decrease in conflicting evidence.44 Ultimately, however, all of the 
programs faded away, victims of neglect.45 Even the most famous instance, 
35. Joe S. Cecil & Thomas E. Willging, Accepting Daubert's Invitation: Defining a Role for 
Court-Appointed Expens in Assessing Scientific Validity, 43 EMORY L.J. 995, 1004 (1994). 
36. See id. at 1022 (noting judicial complaints about the difficulty of locating appropriate 
experts); Gross, supra note 13, at 1191 (observing that one barrier to court-appointed experts is the 
difficulty of finding experts). 
37. P. 140; see also Landsman, supra note 25, at 146 (reporting significant discussions in 
mid-nineteenth century medical journals on having panels of experts). 
38. Landsman, supra note 25, at 146 (citing JAMES c. MOHR, DOCTORS AND THE LAW: 
MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 211 (1993)). 
39. Friedman, supra note 10, at 250. 
40. SPECIAL COMM. ON THE MED. EXPERT TESTIMONY PROJECT, Ass'N OF THE BAR OF THE 
CITY OF NEW YORK, IMPARTIAL MEDICAL TESTIMONY (1956). 
41. Gross, supra note 13, at 1192 (citing Theodore I. Bouer, T he Coun-Appointed lmpanial 
Expen, in USING EXPERTS IN CIVIL CASES, 57, 62 n.17 (Melvin D. Kraft ed., 1977)). 
42. Elwood S. Levy, lmpanial Medical Testimony-Revisited, 34 TEMP. L.Q. 416, 417 
(1961) (describing the establishment of the Baltimore Project in 1955 under Emory H. Niles, Chief 
Judge of the Supreme Bench). 
43. See Francis L. Van Dusen, The Impartial Medical Expen System: The Judicial Point of 
View, 34 TEMP. L.Q. 386, 390 n.12 (1961) (reporting the rule in 1959 allowing panels in the North­
ern District of Illinois); Henry Menin & Gary Charles Leedes, Note, The Present Status of the 
lmpanial Medical Expen in Civil Litigation, 34 TEMP. L.Q. 476, 476-77 (1961) (conducting survey 
that showed plans in effect in Miami, Cleveland, Baltimore, and Los Angeles, and in the federal 
courts for the Western and Eastern Districts of Pennsylvania). All of the plans appeared to have 
standing panels except for Cleveland's, in which courts made requests to the Academy of Medicine 
in Cleveland. Menin & Leedes, supra, at 480-81 & n.35. 
44. David W. Peck, Impartial Medical Testimony: A Way to Better and Quicker Justice, 22 
F.R.D. 21, 24, 24-25 (1958) (reporting that judges and lawyers in New York project cases were 
pleased with results); Van Dusen, supra note 43, at 394 (reporting results from the Eastern District 
of Pennsylvania). 
45. Gross, supra note 13, at 1192 (reporting that the New Jersey project was only used six 
times a year from 1961 to 1975, and that the Los Angeles project was not used at all from 1966 to 
1967). 
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the New York Medical Expert Testimony Project, so promising at first,46 
never really caught on.47 In the end, only 3 to 6 percent of the applicable 
personal injury trials took advantage of the project, and "[b]y 1976, the pro­
ject had fallen into general disuse."48 
Today, the list concept has once again resurfaced. For example, until it 
recently closed in 2003, the Private Adjudication Center at Duke University 
School of Law maintained a Registry of Independent Scientific and Techni­
cal Advisors.49 T he American Association for the Advancement of Science50 
has also established the Court Appointed Scientific Experts (CASE) pro­
gram, which has been matching interested judges with vetted scientific 
experts since 200 1 .51 T he latest embodiment of the recurring theme, CASE 
has been endorsed by Justice Breyer and the House Committee on Science,52 
but if history is any indication, it too faces an uphill battle. 
2. Scientific Tribunals and Expert Juries 
A related but distinct proposal focuses on using scientific tribunals or 
other types of expert decisionmakers.53 Concerned about jury ignorance? 
Replace the lay jury with an expert one.54 As Golan notes, expert juries have 
an ancient lineage at common law.55 "Trade disputes" often involved juries 
of "goldsmiths, booksellers, wine merchants, attorneys, and fishmongers," 
particularly when the jury had to decide if guild regulations had been vio-
46. Peck, supra note 44, at 24 (reporting that the New York project had processed 575 cases 
by 1958, with 330 settled at pre-trial, 62 settled at trial, and 68 tried). The New York project was 
established in December 1952. Note, The New York Medical Expen Project: An Experiment in Se­
curing Impanial Testimony, 63 YALE L.J. 1023, 1023-24 (1954). 
47. Gross, supra note 13, at 1192. 
48. Id. 
49. See Joe S. Cecil, Construing Science in the Quest for "Ipse Dixit": A Comment on Sand­
ers and Cohen, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 967, 971 & nn.17 & 19 (2003) (discussing the use of the 
Duke registry in Soldo v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 244 F. Supp. 2d 434 (W.D. Pa. 2003)). The Private 
Adjudication Center effectively closed in 2003, in part due to funding issues. See Open Letter from 
Professor Thomas B. Metzloff and Cheryl J. Zielsdorf (July 17, 2003) (on file with author). 
50. CASE technically operates under the auspices of the National Conference of Lawyers 
and Scientists, a joint committee of AAAS and the American Bar Association Science and Technol­
ogy Section. See American Association for the Advancement of Science, CASE Mainpage, 
http://www.aaas.org/spp/case/case.htm (last visited Jan. 29, 2006). 
51. Id. 
52. Id. 
53. KAYE ET AL., supra note 27, § 10.4.1, at 348 n.6 (describing expert decisionmakers as a 
"variation[] on [the] theme" of court-appointed experts). 
54. See James Oldham, The History of the Special (Strock) Jury in the United States and Its 
Relation to Voir Dire Practices, the Reasonable Cross-Section Requirement, and Peremptory Chal­
lenges, 6 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 623, 655 (1998) ("The notion of bringing experts into dispute 
settlement processes makes good common sense and has an extensive history."). 
55. Pp. 18-19. See generally James C. Oldham, The Origins of the Special Jury, 50 U. CHI. 
L. REv. 137 ( 1983) (providing a history of special juries until the mid-eighteenth century). 
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lated.56 Special juries were also used in cases involving foreigners and other 
special groups including "Jews (but not gypsies), Welshmen (but not Scots), 
clerics, university scholars, merchants, and other guild members,"57 and 
cases involving claims of pregnancy.58 Even Lord Mansfield used merchant­
jurors in commerce cases to develop the commercial law for which he be­
came famous.59 By the t ime of the great scientific evidence debates of the 
mid- 1800s, however, expert juries had vanished (p. 20). 
Expert jury proposals soon reemerged. As Golan reports, in 1 862, a con­
cerned British Association for the Advancement of Science ("BAAS") 
proposed abolishing the jury in technical cases and replacing it with a judge 
and "up to three skilled assessors" (pp. 121-22). Although initially thought 
infeasible due to English jury traditions (p. 122), a BAAS-related reform 
eventually won out. Golan notes that the expert evidence problem subsided 
in England after the late nineteenth century as technical trials were diverted 
from the jury (pp. 1 38,143). 
We can readily enrich Golan's discussion with parallels from across the 
Atlantic. At the time of the Founding, U.S. courts also used special juries. 
Merchant juries were prevalent in late-eighteenth-century New York and 
South Carolina,60 and in antebellum Louisiana.61 Merchant juries similarly 
disappeared in New York and South Carolina circa 1 800.62 Louisiana per­
sisted, but its use of merchant juries quickly declined after the abolition of 
its Commercial Court in 1 846.63 
Of course, U.S. courts did not adopt British-type jury reforms in the late 
1800s (pp. 138-39), nor have they since, for the Seventh Amendment and its 
state counterparts have always presented formidable obstacles. In the late 
1970s, legal historians Patrick Devlin and Morris Arnold, among others, 
c lashed over whether the Seventh Amendment extended to complex civil 
56. P. 19; see Hand, supra note 9, at 41-42 (noting that expert juries were common in Lon­
don in the fourteenth century for trade disputes); Oldham, supra note 55, at 174 (describing a 1394 
jury of "cooks and fishmongers, where one was accused of selling bad food" (quoting JAMES BRAD­
LEY THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 94 & n.4 (1898)); id. 
(describing a libel trial in which the defendant requested jurors from the publishing industry). 
57. P. 19. These groups were entitled to special juries "of the half tongue," in which half of 
the jurors belonged to the defendant's group. Id. 
58. P. 19. Pregnant women could "plead the belly," thereby obtaining a reprieve during preg­
nancy. All-female juries of matrons were used as investigators in these cases. See Oldham, supra 
note 55, at 171-72. 
59. P. 2 1; Oldham, supra note 55, at 173 (noting that merchant juries "existed long before 
Lord Mansfield"). 
60. MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780- 1860, at 155-58 
( 1977), discussed in Oldham, supra note 54, at 642-43. 
61. Oldham, supra note 54, at 657-58. 
62. HORWITZ, supra note 60, at 157-59 (noting disappearance of merchant juries in New 
York after 1807 and South Carolina after 1797). 
63. Oldham, supra note 54, at 658 (noting that until then, the Louisiana court was the "clos­
est approximation in the United States to Lord Mansfield's use of merchant juries to incorporate 
mercantile practices into the common law"). 
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cases.64 By and large, this most recent attempt to abolish juries in complex 
cases failed.65 Arguably the only remnant is a curious Delaware statute au­
thorizing the use of special juries in complex cases,66 and this statute has 
fared no better than its court-appointed expert counterparts. Requests for 
special juries under the Delaware provision are frequently denied for lack of 
sufficient complexity, with some judges appearing hostile to the whole con­
cept. 67 Indeed, the few special jury statutes that remain on the books are 
generally neglected or disparaged by courts.68 Even when a court offers to 
empanel a special jury, as Judge Rubin did in the Bendectin multidistrict 
litigation, the parties generally decline.69 
An alternative path around these roadblocks is to empanel scientific ad­
visory tribunals to help jurors or judges. Early commentators, including 
Learned Hand, proposed just that. 70 Variants of this reform have been much 
discussed lately, particularly in the wake of the silicone breast implant liti­
gation. As part of the breast implant multidistrict litigation, Judge Pointer 
established a National Science Panel of court-appointed experts under Rule 
64. Compare Patrick Devlin, Jury Trial of Complex Cases: English Practice at the Time of 
the Seventh Amendment, 80 COL UM. L. REV. 43, 65-77 (1980) (arguing that juries were not histori­
cally used in complex equity cases), with Morris S. Arnold, A Historical Inquiry into the Right to 
Trial by Jury in Complex Civil litigation, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 829, 848 (1980) (arguing that there 
"seems to be no good historical foundation for the argument that plaintiffs may be denied the right 
to a jury trial because their cases are complex"). For citations to the extensive literature in this de­
bate, see Oldham, supra note 55, at 138 n.5. 
65. Oldham, supra note 54, at 655-56 & n.204 (arguing, however, that the decision in 
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 ( 1996), may have made inroads on the jury 
right in patent cases). 
66. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 4506 (2005) ('The Court may order a special jury upon the 
application of any patty in a complex civil case."), noted in Oldham, supra note 54, at 634; In re 
Asbestos Litigation, 551 A.2d 1296 (Del. Super. Ct. 1988) (upholding constitutionality of statute). 
67. See Bradley v. AC. & S. Co., 1989 WL 70834 (Del. Super. Ct. May 23, 1989) (rejecting 
a special jury motion because most science can be explained to ordinary jurors and expressing con­
cerns that special jurors might have preconceived ideas); Oldham, supra note 54, at 659 (noting the 
resistance of superior court judges to special juries). Oldham notes that special juries are used occa­
sionally in Delaware nevertheless. Oldham, supra note 54, at 661--62 (citing McLain v. General 
Motors Corp., 569 A.2d 579 (Del. 1990), and Ramada Inns, Inc. v. Dow Jones & Co., 1987 WL 
283 11 (Del. Super. Ct. Oct. 22, 1987)). 
· 
68. E.g., Oldham, supra note 54, at 641-42 (discussing Schuster v. City of New York, 205 
N.Y.S.2d 190 (Sup. Ct. 1960), in which the judge denied the special jury request and "expressed his 
strong distaste for the elitist nature of 'blue ribbon' juries"). See generally id. at 633-41 (reporting 
states with special jury statutes: Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Indiana, Maryland, New York, Vir­
ginia, West Virginia; and states with them under common law: Alaska and Hawaii). Judicial hostility 
is no small wonder, given that special juries were historically often fueled by elitist or racist senti­
ments. See Lawrence M. Friedman, Some Notes on the Civil Jury in Historical Perspective, 48 
DEPAUL L. REv. 201, 216 (1998) ('The whole concept of a 'blue-ribbon' jury is suspect today-and 
for good reason."). 
69. In re Richardson-Merrell, Inc. "Bendectin" Prods. Liab. Litig., 624 F. Supp. 1212, 1217 
(S.D. Ohio 1985). As Judge Rubin acknowledged, blue-ribbon juries are not recognized under the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thus, "[o]nly by agreement of all parties could [a blue-ribbon 
jury] have been used." Id. at 1217; see also Joseph Sanders, From Science to Evidence: The Testi­
mony on Causation in the Bendectin Cases, 46 STAN. L. REv. 1, 81 (1993) (discussing blue-ribbon 
juries). 
70. Hand, supra note 9, at 56-57; see also Note, Expen Testimony in Judicial Proceedings, 9 
ALB. L.J. 122, 122 (1874) (advocating for a similar proposal). 
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706 to assess substantive causation issues.71 Somewhat differently, Judge 
Jones of the District of Oregon used a panel of technical advisors to help the 
court assess its breast-implant-related Daubert issues.7 2 Promising solu­
tions? Certainly. But despite having percolated for over a century, expert 
tribunals continue to be the exception rather than the rule. 
3. Self-Regulation 
One last reform worth mentioning is having professional societies police 
their own members. As Golan describes, some early twentieth-century re­
formers, conceding the inviolability of the jury, pinned their hopes on self­
regulation by the professions.73 For example, in 1910, the great hope was 
that codes of ethics would encourage more scrupulous expert testimony.74 
Consistently clever, Golan even links Frye's "general acceptance" standard 
to attempts to use professional associations as a regulatory mechanism (p. 
258). 
Here too, further inquiry reveals self-regulation to be a recurring reform. 
The idea reappeared in Minnesota in the 1940s, when physicians tried to 
make biased testimony a violation of ethics rules.75 Most recently, the 
American Medical Association has taken the lead, encouraging licensing 
boards to discipline members for unethical testimony.76 
Predictably, the reform has stalled. Recent studies show that only seven 
out of thirty-six specialty organizations surveyed had clearly defined disci­
plinary procedures for addressing unethical testimony.77 The vanguard of the 
movement, the American Association of Neurological Surgeons ("AANS" ), 
has conducted fifty investigations since 1983, with only ten resulting in dis­
cipline. 78 
71. See Allison v. McGhan Med. Corp., 184 F.3d 1300, 1310-11 & n.9 (11th Cir. 1999) 
(discussing the appointment of a National Science Panel in the multidistrict phase of the silicone 
breast implant litigation); Goss et al, supra note 24, at 238-39; Barbara S. Hulka et al., Experience 
of a Scientific Panel Formed to Advise the Federal Judiciary on Silicone Breast Implants, 342 NEW 
ENG. J. MED. 812, 812-14 (2000) (discussing procedures used by the Pointer panel). 
72. Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 947 F. Supp. 1387, 1392-94 (D. Or. 1996). 
73. P. 257; see also BARTLETT, supra note 24, at 16-17, 22-23 (arguing that medical asso­
ciations should regulate medical experts through ethics rules, and that these internal reforms would 
be ideal because they would not interfere with "existing rules of judicial procedure"); Friedman, 
supra note 10, at 256 (arguing for professional standards for experts as the only practical solution). 
74. P. 258. But see KAYE ET AL., supra note 27, § 10.4.2, at 359 (noting that professional 
ethics codes often have provisions on expert testimony, but that these provisions are largely aspira­
tional). 
75. Menin & Leedes, supra note 43, at 478 (noting that such provisions were difficult to 
enforce). 
76. KAYE ET AL., supra note 27, § 10.4.2, at 359 n.60 (citing Amer. Med.I Ass'n Policy 
Statements H-265.993 and H-265.992). 
77. Aubrey Milunsky, Lies, Damned Lies, and Medical Experts: T he Abrogation of Respon­
sibility by Specialty Organizations and a Call for Action, 18 J. CHILD NEUROLOGY 413, 416 (2003). 
78. KAYE ET AL., supra note 27, § 10.4.2, at 359-60. The Seventh Circuit upheld AANS's 
disciplinary practices in 2001. Austin v. Amer. Ass'n of Neurological Surgeons, 253 F.3d 967, 973-
74 (7th Cir. 2001) (Posner, J.) ("More policing of expert witnessing is required, not less."). 
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Even if successful, these reforms seem ill-conceived---or at minimum, 
incomplete-and not just because of the adage that self-regulation means no 
regulation. Typical scientists, as unlicensed professionals, simply do not 
have professional societies strong enough to give their ethical codes teeth. 
At the same time, self-policing by doctors and other more organized profes­
sional groups will inevitably yield perverse results. Exactly who files 
disciplinary charges? Judges, lawyers, and the general public cannot-they 
are precluded under a self-regulation scheme. Opposing experts in typical 
slip-and-fall cases will not-few if any will waste valuable time and energy 
filing grievances. The primary movers under a self-regulation regime will be 
the doctor-defendants sued for malpractice, hoping to chill plaintiffs'  ex­
perts.79 Indeed, in twenty years, all but one of the AANS claims have been 
filed against plaintiffs'  experts. 80 
D. The Big Question 
So the big question raised by Laws of Men and Laws of Nature is this: 
are we in fact spinning our wheels? Is this latest feverish round of scientific 
evidence debates and proposals just another iteration of a seemingly endless 
(and pointless) cycle? 
Over a century ago, Justice Willard Bartlett of New York remarked that 
many medical expert reforms had already been proposed, but none had 
"been carried into effect ."81 The reason, Justice Bartlett suggested, was op­
position from the bar and the adversarial and jury traditions of the country.82 
Golan's account concurs (pp. 140, 256). Proposals for abolishing the jury or 
instituting special tribunals infringe on the jury tradition, and independent 
experts infringe on the adversarial system and its peculiar view of court neu­
trality (p. 256). Consequently, while the end of the nineteenth century 
teemed with solutions, none were actually helpful (p. 256). Judges and leg­
islatures were reluctant to toy with the adversarial system (p. 140). 
And so it has been in the ensuing years. For example, while a few bar 
associations supported official expert lists, many opposed them. The Mary­
land Bar Association and the Baltimore City Bar Association came out 
against the Baltimore Project, and the Medico-Legal Committee of the 
Philadelphia Bar Association opposed the Eastern District of Pennsylvania's 
plan.83 More recently, the Association of Trial Lawyers of America 
("ATLA" ) has vehemently opposed the CASE project, arguing that there is 
no need for court-appointed experts, that neutral experts do not exist, and 
that CASE would undermine "the adversarial process that has stood at the 
79. Austin, 253 F.3d at 972-73. 
80. KAYE ET AL., supra note 27, § 10.4.2, at 361. 
81. BARTLETT, supra note 24, at 3. 
82. Id. at 12, 15-16. 
83. Levy, supra note 42, at 419. 
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heart of the Anglo-Saxon judicial system for more thai1 eight hundred 
years."84 
Modern commentators concur with this explanation. Sam Gross has ar­
gued that the neglect of court-appointed experts today is in large part due to 
trial bar opposition and an adversarially focused judicial outlook.85 Stephan 
Landsman similarly predicts that reform proposals will not "replace more 
adversarial mechanisms any time soon" because they "strengthen already 
too powerful professional establishments and their inquisitorial essence is 
ill-fitted to . . .  adversarial expectations."86 
As Golan rightly comments, to fix the expert testimony problem, some­
thing must yield in the "sacred triangulation of the adversarial system-the 
political postulate of the lay jury, the traditional right of the parties to fur­
nish all evidence, or the neutral position of the court" (pp. 256-57). England 
addressed its problem by sacrificing juries (p. 138). The Seventh Amend­
ment sternly informs us that no such thing is happening here. As an 
ideological institution of liberty and a bulwark of Jacksonian democracy, the 
lay jury carries too much baggage in the United States (p. 1 39). 
So is there any hope? One possibility may be Daubert itself, whose true 
import is not its oft-quoted four-factor test87 but rather the shift in judicial 
thinking that it promotes.88 Since Daubert, judges have increasingly em­
braced their role as scientific gatekeepers, seriously inserting themselves 
into the process of receiving expert evidence perhaps for the first time in 
history. To be sure, Golan notes that courts have turned to evidence law in 
the past: the ultimate issue rule, the requirement of hypothetical questions 
for experts, and the hearsay doctrine were all nineteenth-century attempts to 
rein in experts (pp. 140-43). Even Frye itself supported this effort by half­
heartedly requiring judges to police expert evidence (pp. 258, 263...:()4).  Yet I 
surmise that the post-Daubert world may be different. Judges under Daubert 
grapple substantively with science, forcing the good ones to inform them­
selves about scientific concepts and methods, and placing pressure on their 
traditionally passive mien. No longer can they count heads or hide behind 
arcane and formalistic evidence rules. The more judges take active roles, the 
weaker adversarial norms will become.89 This transformative potential of 
Daubert, coupled with the modern willingness to accept the role of the 
84. Lisa Gelhaus, A Case Against CASE, TRIAL, Aug. 1999, at 11, 13 (quoting ATLA posi-
tion paper (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
85. Gross, supra note 13, at 1197-98. 
86. Landsman, supra note 25, at 156. 
87. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 509 U.S. 579, 593-94 (1993) (falsifiability, peer re­
view, standards and error rates, and general acceptance). 
88. Edward K. Cheng & Albert H. Yoon, Does Frye or Daubert Matter? A Study of Scientific 
Admissibility Standards, 91 VA. L. REV. 471, 503 (2005). 
89. Id. (characterizing Daubert as a move toward ·�udicial management" to reduce court 
costs and arguing that the trend will continue). 
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managerial judge,90 may encourage a greater degree of inquisitorial thinking, 
opening the door to institutions like court-appointed experts and scientific 
tribunals. 
* * *  
The observant reader will note that in writing this review, I have seem­
ingly skipped the last third of Golan's book, the part dealing with blood 
microscopy, x-rays, and lie detectors. This neglect should not be interpreted 
as passive criticism, but rather a function of available space. Indeed, the 
chapters are filled with other worthwhile accounts of the interplay between 
law and science, in which one can see parallels to other modem scientific 
evidence issues as well: blood microscopy to the problem of unresolved 
scientific questions (p. 172), x-rays to recent debates over videotape and 
computer evidence (p. 209), and lie detectors to the future possibility of us­
ing brain mapping (pp. 248--49).91 
* * *  
Professor Golan has produced an important work, a long-overdue his­
torical addition to the scientific evidence literature. It is a must-read, not 
only for scientific evidence scholars, but also for anyone seeking a richer 
understanding of the continuing and frustrating conflicts between law and 
science. In his well-known book, Mirjan Damaska paints a sunny future for 
scientific evidence, arguing that science in the courtroom will cause a shift 
toward special juries, court-appointed experts, and the like.92 After reading 
Laws of Men and Laws of Nature, I am admittedly less sanguine, but I re­
main hopeful, for Daubert may be · just the new beginning that scientific 
evidence has been waiting for. 
90. See generally Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. 
L. REV. 128 1 (1976) (discussing the new judicial managerial role); Judith Resnik, Managerial 
Judges, 96 H ARV. L. REV. 374 (1982) (same). 
9 1. See Robin Marantz Henig, Looking for the Lie, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2006 (Magazine), at 
47 (describing the latest generation of polygraphs). 
92. MIRJAN DAMASKA, EVIDENCE LAW ADRIFT 143-52 (1997). 
